The Political Economy of Illegal Parking in Makassar City: Power Relations, Rent Practices, and Regional Revenue Leakage

Abstract

Illegal parking has become one of the urban governance problems that continues to develop in various cities, including Makassar City. Beyond its impact on traffic congestion and the management of public spaces, illegal parking also reflects the dynamics of political economy involving power relations, informal institutions, and the struggle for access to urban public resources. This study aims to analyze how the political economy of illegal parking is formed and survives in Makassar City, identify the actors involved, understand the mechanism of economic benefit distribution that occurs, and explain its implications for urban governance and regional revenue management. The research uses a qualitative approach with a case study design. Data was collected through field observations, in-depth interviews, and documentation studies involving elements of local government, parking managers, informal parking attendants, business actors, and parking service users. Data analysis was carried out using the interactive model of Miles, Huberman, and Saldana using the perspective of rent-seeking theory, informal institutions, and urban governance. The results show that illegal parking practices operate through networks of actors connected by informal rules regarding land division, income distribution, conflict resolution, and social legitimacy. These informal institutions allow rent-seeking practices to take place through the control of public parking spaces and generate the distribution of economic benefits outside of the government's formal fiscal mechanisms. The study also found that illegal parking contributes to the leakage of regional revenues, weakens accountability, and gives rise to forms of governance that bring together formal and informal actors in the management of urban public spaces. The main contribution of this research lies in the development of a shadow governance perspective to explain that illegal parking is not just a parking administrative problem, but a political economy phenomenon formed by power relations, informal institutions, and urban resource contestation. The research recommends strengthening parking digitalization, increasing supervision, and integrating informal actors into a more transparent and accountable parking governance system.